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Abstract 
 
The paper analyzes the individual and regional determinants of unemployment 
benefit sanctions in Germany. On the basis of an administrative data set a multi-
level hazard rate model in discrete time for the transitions into a sanction is esti-
mated, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity on the individual and regional 
level. It is shown that certain benefit recipients, e.g. younger people, are more 
likely to receive sanctions than e.g. older, disabled, or skilled individuals. More-
over, the risk of being sanctioned not only depends on individual characteristics 
but is also influenced by the sanction policies of the employment agencies. 
 
 
Zusammenfassung 
 
Der Beitrag untersucht individuelle und regionale Determinanten von Sanktionen, 
die Unterstützungsleistungen arbeitsloser Leistungsempfänger in Deutschland 
mindern. Auf Basis von neu verfügbaren Geschäftsdaten der Bundesagentur für 
Arbeit werden sanktionierte und unsanktionierte Leistungsempfänger verglichen. 
Zudem wird ein multivariates Abgangsratenmodell in diskreter Zeit spezifiziert, 
das unbeobachtete Heterogenität auf individueller und regionaler Ebene kontrol-
liert. Dabei zeigt sich, dass Arbeitslose in ganz unterschiedlichem Maße von 
Sanktionen betroffen sind: Beispielsweise erhalten jüngere Menschen unter 25 
Jahren Sanktionen mit höherer Wahrscheinlichkeit als Ältere über 50 Jahre, 
Schwerbehinderte oder hoch qualifizierte Leistungsempfänger. Das individuelle 
Sanktionsrisiko ist nicht ausschließlich vom Verhalten des Arbeitslosen, sondern 
ebenso von der Sanktionierungspolitik der regionalen Arbeitsagenturen abhän-
gig. 
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1 Introduction 
The ‘JobAqtiv Act’ of late 2001 and the so-called ‘Hartz laws I-IV’ implemented 
between 2003 and 2005 mark important milestones in the reform of active and 
passive labor market policies in Germany. As part of the reorganization of the 
unemployment insurance (UI) system the legal rules for benefit sanctions were 
amended in order to make the imposition of sanctions more effective in Germany. 
These changes in the sanction regime are part of a broader international trend to 
increase the pressure on UI benefit recipients and to ‘activate’ them (cf. Eichhorst 
et al., 2006 or Klammer and Leiber, 2004). 
Primarily due to data limitations so far little is known for the German case about 
the imposition of benefit sanctions and individual sanction probabilities. A de-
scriptive study by Wilke (2004) based on individual data from the ‘Employment 
Sub-sample’ of the Institute for Labor Market and Employment Research exem-
plifies the data restrictions as it cannot discriminate between benefit sanctions in 
a narrower sense (‘Sperrzeiten’) and minor penalties that are in most cases re-
voked (‘Säumniszeiten’). Wilke’s findings do thus not completely correspond to 
actual benefit sanctions that lead to a suspension of benefits. For instance, the 
result that most of the sanctions are withdrawn within a short period of time does 
not hold for benefit sanctions in the narrow sense as aggregate data on the share 
of revoked sanctions show (cf. Müller and Oschmiansky, 2005). 
With the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) a new comprehensive admin-
istrative data set is available (cf. Hummel et al., 2005). On this basis the paper 
aims to broaden the understanding of the imposition of sanctions. Focusing on UI 
benefit sanctions after the rejection of a job offer or a placement into a program 
of active labor market policy (ALMP) that lead to a suspension of benefits the 
following empirical questions will be addressed: What proportion of the newly 
unemployed individuals is actually receiving a benefit sanction? At which point in 
time during the unemployment spell are sanctions predominantly imposed? How 
does the composition of the faction of sanctioned unemployed differ from the 
group that has not received a sanction? What are the individual and regional de-
terminants of the transition rate into a sanction? Which role does the sanction 
policy of the local public employment agency play for the individual sanction 
probability? The wider ranging and complex question concerning the labor mar-
ket effects of sanctions will not be tackled in this short contribution, though. 
In order to answer these research questions I first analyze the transition rate from 
unemployment into a benefit sanction descriptively. Then a multivariate, multi-
level hazard rate model in discrete time that also controls for nested unobserved 
heterogeneity is specified to investigate the individual and regional determinants 
of receiving a benefit sanction. It will be shown that the overall share of sanc-
tioned unemployed is rather small. Only about one percent of newly unemployed 
benefit recipients receives a sanction that effectively reduces their benefits for at 
least 3 weeks. More sanctions are imposed in the first six months of the unem-
ployment spell. The composition of the pool of sanctioned unemployed is mark-
edly different from non-sanctioned benefit recipients: younger and low-qualified 
individuals are over-, women, older, highly-qualified and disabled persons are 
underrepresented among the sanctioned. Unobserved individual characteristics 
of the unemployed also affect the probability of being sanctioned. Moreover, it will 
be shown that there is systematic regional variation in the individual risk of re-
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ceiving a benefit sanction that cannot only be attributed to regional context condi-
tions but also to the sanction policy of the respective employment agency. This 
means that benefit recipients in Germany are not being treated equally with re-
gard to the sanction rules. 
The remainder of the paper consists of five parts. Section 2 briefly reviews the 
literature, discusses the theoretical background for the imposition of sanctions 
and formulates hypotheses. In section 3 the data base is described, the sample 
design is discussed and the variables of the empirical analysis are defined. Sec-
tion 4 outlines the econometric model. The results are presented in section 5. 
Section 6 summarizes my conclusions. 
 
2 State of the Literature and Hypotheses 
The monitoring of the unemployed and the imposition of benefit sanctions can be 
understood as institutional features of UI systems to reduce disincentive effects. 
The theoretical literature on optimal UI design dealing with the effects of sanc-
tions (cf. Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2003) tries to derive the optimal level of 
monitoring and sanctions given their costs and benefits. It is shown that sanc-
tions can improve the incentive structure of UI benefit systems and increase the 
transition rate to employment (Boone and Van Ours, 2000; Boone et al., 2001; 
Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2005). Incorporating sanctions into an UI system can 
be more efficient than an across the board reduction of benefits and is thus po-
tentially welfare improving (Boone and Van Ours, 2000). 
Empirical analyses on benefit sanctions are mainly concerned with their causal 
labor market effects on the transition rate from unemployment to employment. 
The direct incentive effect for those individuals who have received a benefit sanc-
tion is to be distinguished from the threat effect of a potential sanction that affects 
the reservation wage and search intensity of all unemployed benefit recipients. 
There is a series of papers based on experimental data for the U.S. (cf. Meyer, 
1995; Johnson and Klepinger, 1994; Klepinger et al., 2002; Benus et al., 1997 
and Ashenfelter et al., 2005) and for Europe (cf. Dolton and O'Neill, 1996; 
Micklewright and Nagy, 2005; Gorter and Kalb, 1996; Jensen et al., 1999 and 
Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw, 2006). In addition, non-experimental studies 
that draw on administrative data sets were carried out by Keeley and Robins, 
1985, Lalive et al., 2005 and Abbring et al., 2005. Most of the studies conclude 
that sanctions exert a positive impact on the transition rate into employment. In 
several cases the imposition of a sanction is combined with more intensive coun-
seling for the unemployed. 
Whereas in many theoretical models agents are assumed to be homogeneous 
(i.e. everyone has the same sanction probability given his or her behavior), em-
pirical analyses of the sanction effects have to account for individual heterogene-
ity to avoid selection bias in the estimated effects. I am not aware of any publica-
tions analyzing explicitly the determinants of benefit sanctions. Therefore this 
paper is focused on observed and unobserved factors on the individual and re-
gional level that influence the transition process from unemployment into the 
state of an imposed benefit sanction. 
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On the individual level a number of explanations can be thought of that are re-
lated to observable characteristics. First, a certain behavior of the unemployed 
may be related to their socio-economic characteristics. Older people, for in-
stance, tend to be more risk averse than younger persons. Since their employ-
ment options are generally limited, the elderly will be more inclined to accept a 
job offer or to participate in a labor market policy program and therefore will not 
risk a benefit sanction. Younger people could be more careless regarding the 
sanction rules and thus face sanctions with a higher probability. Second, institu-
tional factors restricting the behavior and hence the sanction probability could 
also be relevant. Job search requirements and sanction rules are not imple-
mented uniformly, but applied selectively, e.g. by age or family status. Older un-
employed, single parents as well as disabled persons should thus ceteris paribus 
have lower inflow rates into a penalty. People with larger benefit entitlements 
ought to be sanctioned less often since they have a greater financial incentive to 
avoid a penalty. Third, the capacity of circumventing benefit sanctions may not be 
distributed equally. For instance, highly qualified persons could be more skilled 
and successful in avoiding sanctions which would lead to lower sanction rates. 
Fourth, to some degree societal norms may influence the decision of an employ-
ment officer (not) to impose a benefit sanction. One could imagine that individu-
als who are perceived to be not as flexible, e.g. older people or parents, will not 
be treated as strictly by the Public Employment Service (PES) as e.g. young sin-
gles.  
In addition to the described effects that are related to observable variables unob-
served individual heterogeneity should also play an important role for transitions 
into a benefit sanction. Some individual characteristics (e.g. risk aversion or work 
motivation) cannot be observed but vary between individuals regardless of age, 
sex, etc. Some people could therefore engage in more risky behavior than others 
and thereby accept the higher probability of benefit sanctions. This may lead to 
different sanction rates between on the surface identical people. 
Institutional details of UI design (see e.g. Grubb, 2000) and the implementation of 
sanctions, which both also affect the probability of receiving a benefit sanction, 
are neglected in most of the above mentioned literature. Müller and Oschmiansky 
(2005; 2006) have shown that there is considerable cross-regional variation in 
the implementation of benefit sanctions in Germany. As sanction rules have to be 
executed by the PES, problems of policy implementation arise. Eventually a 
placement counselor decides if a job offer is suitable, or search requirements 
were violated and, therefore, a benefit sanction is warranted. In addition such 
decisions are constrained by the conditions on the regional labor market. This 
leads to regional differences in the monitoring and sanction intensity which have 
an effect on the individual probability of getting sanctioned. 
The following hypotheses can be derived for factors on the regional level. First, 
the situation on the regional labor market influences the sanction probability. The 
individual risk of getting sanctioned is higher when the level and duration of un-
employment is low and the vacancy rate is high; otherwise there would not be 
many possibilities for rejecting job offers made by the PES that could ultimately 
lead to a sanction. Second, implementation variables will have an impact on the 
transition rate into a sanction. An employment agency that has relatively more 
personnel (a favorable staff/client-ratio) and/or maintains a larger secondary la-
bor market has more resources and/or opportunities to impose benefit sanctions. 
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Not least, the sanction policy of an employment agency is crucial: Benefit recipi-
ents living in an employment district where the local agency pursues a stricter 
activation strategy should have a markedly higher probability of benefit sanctions. 
 
3 Data Set, Sample Design and Definition of Variables 
This study uses a new individual data set, the Integrated Employment Biogra-
phies (IEB) from the German PES (see Hummel et al., 2005). Originating from 
four different sources this administrative data contains register data on unem-
ployment insurance and assistance benefits, the participation in programs of 
ALMP, and employment registrations covered by the social security system. It 
comprises all individuals who are either registered as ‘unemployed’ or officially 
‘searching for employment’. The data are merged by means of the social security 
or the PES customer number. 
This spell data set consists of information about different employment states and 
the transitions between those states on a daily basis. The IEB does not record 
data about certain labor market states like self- and civil employment or being out 
of the labor force. As notifications from the employers about new employment 
contracts can arrive delayed there are data gaps for the latest year included in 
the IEB. Quarterly inflow samples are used for the years 2001 and 2002 which 
are randomly drawn from the population of unemployed individuals receiving un-
employment insurance or assistance benefits and therefore being at risk of get-
ting sanctioned (for more details see WZB and infas, 2006). Samples were drawn 
and estimations carried out separately for both sexes as well as for East and 
West Germany. 
For the empirical analysis benefit sanctions in the sense used here have to be 
distinguished from several short term penalties (maximum of seven days), includ-
ing penalties for a missed appointment with an employment officer (‘Säum-
niszeiten’), and from the so-called ‘Minderungsbeträge’, when benefits are re-
duced due to a late registration as unemployed. The focus here is thus solely on 
temporary suspensions of benefits (‘Sperrzeiten’) which entail the following types 
of penalties: the rejection of a reasonable job offer from the PES (§ 144 I, No. 2 
SGB III) and the refusal to participate in programs of ALMP (§ 144 I, No. 3 SGB 
III). These cases correspond to the theoretically interesting types of sanctions for 
already unemployed benefit recipients which are intended to reduce adverse in-
centive effects of the UI. 
The dependent variable is the individual transition rate from unemployment to a 
benefit sanction in the form of a temporary suspension of benefits. Only those 
cases are recorded as ‘effective sanctions’ that are followed by a period of 20 
days without benefit payments. This condition guarantees that a benefit sanction 
of at least 3 weeks was not only imposed but also implemented insofar as pay-
ments were actually suspended. If this is not the case either an objection was 
entered and the sanction was lifted or any type of shorter sanction was imposed. 
In constructing the sample only those cases are considered that are actually at 
risk of getting sanctioned. Leaving the state of unemployment, e.g. transitions to 
employment or into a labor market program as well as outflows from benefit re-
ception for other reasons lead to right-censored cases. 
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Independent variables on the individual level are socio-economic characteristics 
like sex, age, level of qualification, disabilities, nationality, benefit level, children 
younger than 3 years in the household, and more than 2 children in the house-
hold. In order to model the labor market and unemployment history of individuals 
the cumulated duration of previous unemployment spells is calculated before the 
individual enters unemployment at the beginning of the observation period. 
Moreover, dummies for the incidence of benefit sanctions and other types of 
shorter penalties before the inflow into unemployment in the observation period 
are specified. The latter two might capture to some extent unobserved individual 
heterogeneity and shall give an indication, whether the individual is prone to re-
ceiving different kinds of penalties. One has to be aware that – if they are corre-
lated with the stochastic process of getting sanctioned – these dummies are not 
completely exogenous. The independent variables are partially time-variant and 
denoted by xtij in the methodological section 4 (for details see WZB and infas, 
2006). The descriptive statistics are discussed in more detail in sub-section 5.1 
(see Tab. 2 below).  
In addition aggregate data on the regional level of employment agencies are util-
ized. These data are available on a monthly basis for the years 2000-2004 and 
can be matched with the individual IEB variables. The covariates (denoted by xtj) 
that are used to model the regional labor supply and demand are the regional 
unemployment rate, the average unemployment duration and the vacancy rate. 
Moreover, implementation indicators like the personnel resources of the agency 
and the size of the secondary labor market are included in the model (for defini-
tions see Tab. 5 and for descriptive statistics Tab. 6 in the Appendix). I did not 
include the regional sanction rate as a proxy variable for the sanction policy of 
the employment agency. Its coefficient could not be interpreted as this variable 
would be endogenous: the dependent variable would also appear in the regional 
sanction rate on the right-hand side. Therefore unobserved heterogeneity at the 
regional level is analyzed explicitly. 
 
4 Econometric Model 
An empirical reduced-form model (cf. Neumann, 1997) is specified to analyze the 
determinants of the hazard rate from unemployment into a sanction which is as-
sumed to have the following continuous time representation: 
(1) )'exp()()|( βλθ xtxt =  . 
θ(.) is the transition rate from unemployment into an ‘effective’ sanction. It is a 
function of the time variable t denoting the elapsed duration since entering the 
state of unemployment and conditioned on observed covariates x. θ(.) is as-
sumed to have a Proportional Hazards (PH) specification given the vector x (see 
Lancaster, 1990; Jenkins, 2005). The term λ(t) symbolizes the baseline hazard 
function depending on t but not on x and is assumed to be common to all per-
sons. The individual-specific (and non-negative) function exp(x’β) scales the 
baseline hazard. Therefore this specification is also known as multiplicative haz-
ard model. Proportionality means that absolute changes in x imply proportionate 
changes in θ(.) at each t, moreover the effects of x are assumed to be constant 
over time. 
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Although it is often impossible to justify the PH assumption on theoretical 
grounds (cf. Neumann, 1997), these types of models have been popular in ap-
plied research (Devine and Kiefer, 1993). Van den Berg, 2000 shows that under 
certain assumptions a PH specification can be derived from economic search 
theory. In the subsequent analysis θ(.) is modeled in discrete time (cf. Allison, 
1982) for the following reasons: First, the baseline hazard rate can be specified 
very flexibly (see below). This means that the assumption of proportionality 
needs only to hold in smaller time intervals. Second, as time is observed in dis-
crete units there would be a number of ‘ties’ in a continuous time model. Third, it 
is easy to incorporate time-varying covariates. The continuous time IEB data set 
is thus expanded into the person-period format generating monthly time intervals 
(see e.g. Jenkins, 1995). The discrete time representation of the proportional 
hazards function θ(.) is referred to as the ‘complementary log-log model’ (see e.g. 
Singer and Willet, 2003 or Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002) and looks like follows: 
(2) )]''exp(exp[1),,( 210 tjtijttjtijt xxxxth βββκ +++−−=  . 
Thereby ht(.) represents the discrete time hazard rates at the end of the respec-
tive time interval and κt is the difference between the integrated baseline hazard 
rates at the beginning and the end of the interval (see e.g. Jenkins, 2005). The 
threefold indexing represents the 3-level structure of the discrete time data (see 
e.g. Goldstein, 1995 for similar models) distinguishing: t=1,2,…, T time periods 
(measured in months) for each individual, i=1,2,…,N individuals and j=1,2,…,141 
West German as well as j=1,2,…,40 East German employment districts. 
Two types of explanatory variables are incorporated into the model. The matrix xtij 
contains observable individual characteristics whereas xtj includes observable 
regional covariates like the level and the structure of unemployment, the number 
of vacancies or the personnel resources of the employment agency which should 
also influence the individual probability of a sanction. The variables, both in xtij 
and xtj, may also vary over time (see section 3). 
The functional form that characterizes the duration dependence is modeled flexi-
bly using a piecewise constant specification. This means that the baseline hazard 
is assumed to be constant within groups of months whereas the hazard can differ 
between these groups. This is technically realized by the inclusion of a set of 
dummy variables into the model that are equal to one in the respective time pe-
riod and equal to zero otherwise (Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002; Lancaster, 
1990). The baseline hazard is given as follows:  
(3) )]...exp(exp[1)( 2211 JtJttt DDDth γγγ +++−−=  . 
In most applications unobserved heterogeneity is only considered for the individ-
ual level. In section 2 it was mentioned that important individual characteristics 
are unobserved and not included in xtij. The same is true for unobserved vari-
ables at the regional PES agency level – especially a PES agency’s sanction 
policy – which are not captured by xtj. As argued in the theoretical considerations 
above unobserved factors on the regional PES agency level (e.g. due to differ-
ences in policy implementation and PES performance) may also influence the 
sanction intensity and therefore the individual sanction probability. If those factors 
are ignored the baseline hazard and parameters for xtij and xtj are biased and 
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inconsistently estimated in (2) (cf. Heckman and Singer, 1984a or Lancaster, 
1990). Moreover standard errors in such models are underestimated.  
For this reason the terms vij, vj, are incorporated into the empirical model repre-
senting unobserved heterogeneity at the individual and the regional level. These 
heterogeneity terms are assumed to be constant over time. Following Heckman 
and Singer (1984b) a non-parametric approach is chosen to model time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity at the individual (vij) and the regional (vj) level. It is 
specified as an arbitrary discrete distribution with a set of ‘mass points’. These 
locations are estimated freely whereas individual probabilities of being located at 
each point are attached to them. For the example of two heterogeneity classes at 
the individual level (denoted by a and b) vij has the values vij=(vija,vijb) with prob-
abilities Pr(vija)=pa and Pr(vijb)=pb=1-pa. If there are also two classes at the re-
gional level (denoted by c and d), then vj has the values vj=(vjc,vjd) with probabili-
ties Pr(vjc)=pc and Pr(vjd)=pd =1-pc. It is assumed that vij and vj fulfill the following 
conditions: 
(4) ( ) 1Pr
1
=∑
=
L
l
ijmv  , ( ) 1Pr
1
=∑
=
M
m
jmv  , 
( ) 1Pr
1
=∑
=
L
l
ijlijl vv  , ( ) 1Pr
1
=∑
=
M
m
jmjm vv  , 
0][][][][ ==== jtjlijtjljtijlijtijl xvExvExvExvE  and 
0][ =jmijlvvE  . 
Unobserved heterogeneity is then introduced into the duration model by allowing 
the intercept β0 to vary between different types of individuals and regions. It is 
replaced by vij, vj (see Sastry, 1997 for a similar model). The hazard function in-
cluding individual and regional heterogeneity terms looks like follows: 
(5) )]''exp(exp[1),,( 21 tjtijjijttjtijtij xxvvxxth ββκ ++++−−= . 
Since an inflow sample is used, the individual likelihood contribution for a right-
censored spell equals the discrete time survivor function: 
(6) ∏
=
−==>=
t
k
kiiii htStTL
1
)1()()Pr( . 
For the completed spell it is given by the discrete time density function (see 
Lancaster, 1990 or Jenkins, 2005): 
(7) ∏
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The overall likelihood results from the product of individual likelihoods. After in-
corporating the above outlined heterogeneity terms and re-arranging the follow-
ing overall sample likelihood can be derived: 
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Thereby δi symbolizes a censoring indicator with the value δi=1 for complete, and 
δi=0 for right-censored spells. The hazard function from (5) is then plugged into 
(8), logs are taken for computational simplicity and the model is estimated with 
the help of the program package Gllamm (see Rabe-Hesketh et al., 2004) which 
is implemented in Stata. 
 
5 Empirical Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Basic statistics for the IEB data samples are provided in Tab. 1 for the inflows in 
2001 and 2002. The inflow samples contain a total of about 80,000 spells per 
year. An ‘effective’ sanction which suspends benefit payments for at least 20 
days is imposed in 1.2% (West) and 0.5% (East) of all inflow spells. This small 
share is consistent with aggregate administrative data for Germany where the 
rate of imposed sanctions in relation to all inflows of unemployed is also around 
1%. Abbring et al., 2005 who utilize a comparable data set report similarly small 
numbers whereas the higher share of sanctions in comparable Suisse data re-
flects a much stricter sanction regime in this country (cf. Lalive et al., 2005). In 
addition Tab. 1 shows that in West Germany a slightly higher share of sanctions 
is imposed during the first six months of the unemployment spell. After that the 
transition rate into an effective sanction steadily declines with the elapsed unem-
ployment duration. 
 
Tab. 1 Sample statistics, inflow samples 2001 and 2002 
 West Germany East Germany 
Variable Inflows 2001 Inflows 2002 Inflows 2001 Inflows 2002
No. spells 81,392 82,089 80,060 79,870
No. individuals 79,602 80,311 78,698 78,278
No. ‘effective’ sanctions 1,078 972 431 404
% of which within (of un-
employment spell)  
1-3 months 20.71 21.19 12.33 14.36
4-6 months 15.88 23.66 14.88 20.54
7-9 months 10.68 13.48 13.26 16.34
10-12 months 9.94 11.73 10.70 11.14
13-15 months 7.52 8.02 6.51 10.40
16-20 months 12.35 9.05 12.09 11.39
21-25 months 7.71 6.38 9.53 8.66
>25 months 15.23 6.48 20.70 7.18
Sources:  IEB and the authors’ own calculations. 
 
The descriptive comparison between spells of sanctioned and non-sanctioned 
unemployed shows considerable differences with respect to several individual 
characteristics from which a profile of the sanctioned unemployed can be derived 
(see Tab. 2). Women receive a benefit sanction less frequently than men. Highly 
qualified unemployed are also clearly under-represented in the group of unem-
ployed having received a benefit sanction. Moreover, older and disabled unem-
ployed get a benefit sanction less frequently than their respective comparison 
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groups. In East Germany older unemployed are sanctioned a little more often 
compared to the West. 
The most over-represented group among newly unemployed persons receiving a 
benefit sanction are younger individuals below the age of 25 years whose portion 
in West Germany is more than 40% and nearly 50% in the East. The share of 
younger persons in the comparison groups is only 20% respectively. Between 
2001 and 2004 the share of younger individuals among sanctioned unemployed 
increased by 10 and 15 percentage points in the West and East respectively (re-
sults not shown; cf. WZB and infas, 2006). Unemployed with no formal qualifica-
tion receive a sanction much more frequently than qualified people. Immigrants 
are sanctioned with an above-average frequency only in West Germany. 
 
Tab. 2 Comparison of unemployment spells without and with benefit sanction, 
inflow samples 2001-2002 
Variable West Germany East Germany 
 No sanction Sanction No sanction Sanction
Women (%) 39.41 27.01 38.76 22.57 
University qualification (%) 3.32 0.65 3.44 0.70 
No formal qualification (%) 32.83 41.45 15.36 23.86 
Younger than 25 years (%) 19.91 40.84 20.19 48.65 
Older than 50 years (%) 15.76 2.94 20.17 4.80 
Disabled (%) 3.03 1.12 2.30 0.94 
Immigrants (%) 11.61 17.34 2.77 3.63 
Child < 3 years (%) 7.28 5.84 5.33 4.44 
> 2 children (%) 3.90 3.22 2.72 1.52 
Daily benefit payment (€) 23.81 19.74 20.33 16.81 
Unemployment experience (%) 13.92 16.31 21.19 21.00 
Sanction experience (%) 0.67 2.43 0.41 1.05 
Other penalties experience (%) 0.47 1.54 0.39 1.29 
No. spells 162,907 2,140 160,143 855 
Sources: IEB and the authors’ own calculations. 
 
Moreover, the sanction probability seems to decrease with a higher level of bene-
fit payments. The average benefit level per day of a non-sanctioned unemployed 
amounts to 24€ (West) and 20.5€ (East), whereas the sanctioned unemployed 
received 19.5€ (West) and 16.5€ (East) per day. This discrepancy can partly be 
explained by the different socio-economic composition of both groups. Only in 
West Germany sanctioned unemployed have experienced slightly higher unem-
ployment durations over the last five years before the observation period. Indi-
viduals who get a benefit sanction had on average more often been hit with a 
benefit sanction prior to the observed period. This group had also experienced 
more short-term penalties in the past. The latter applies for Germany as a whole. 
 
5.2 Results from Hazard Rate Models 
Multivariate hazard rate models are specified to investigate the determinants of 
the imposition of benefit sanctions. To make the estimations computationally fea-
sible stratified sub-samples had to be drawn from the original samples. This ex-
plains the smaller number of observations. The results are based on the inflows 
into unemployment for the years 2001 and 2002 and given in Tab. 3 and 4 as 
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well as Tab. 7 to 12 in the Appendix. All models were estimated separately for 
men and women and for West and East Germany. In all tables the coefficients for 
the models without and with unobserved heterogeneity are reported to empha-
size the relevance of accounting for unobserved factors. Ultimately, the coeffi-
cients together with the hazard ratios from the full model with unobserved het-
erogeneity are shown to discuss the direction and size of the estimated effects. 
With respect to observed individual characteristics of the sanctioned unemployed 
the basic patterns that emerged from the descriptive analysis are confirmed in 
the multivariate models. Not all relationships remain statistically significant for 
East and West Germany, though, if other observed and unobserved factors are 
taken into account. The results show that younger unemployed (< 25 years) 
clearly get sanctioned with an above-average probability, if other observed and 
unobserved factors are taken into account. The positive coefficient is consistent 
and statistically significant for most of the observed inflow cohorts. This effect is 
also fairly substantial: for young males in West Germany who entered unem-
ployment in 2001 the hazard ratio is nearly five times higher than for males above 
the age of 25 (see Tab. 3). For females of the same inflow cohort this effect is 
considerably larger; the hazard ratio for women below the age of 25 is 16 times 
higher than for older females (see Tab. 4). For the inflow cohorts 2002 the effect 
size diminishes and becomes insignificant for men. In East Germany the same 
relationship is statistically significant only for women with a similar magnitude 
(see Tab. 7 to 12). 
The descriptive findings suggested that low-qualified individuals receive more 
sanctions. This relationship is not confirmed in the multivariate analysis holding 
all other factors constant. For males the variable remains insignificant throughout 
the estimations. For females in West Germany the effect is slightly positive 
whereas it becomes negative in the models for East Germany when unobserved 
heterogeneity is introduced. It seems that being low-qualified does per se not 
increase the individual risk of getting sanctioned. 
On the other hand older (> 50 years) and disabled benefit recipients as well as 
individuals with a university degree are confronted with a lower risk of being 
sanctioned. These relationships are consistent for men and women in East and 
West Germany and statistically significant in most of the estimations. The nega-
tive effect is the largest for older individuals: in West Germany the hazard ratio of 
older men is for the 2001 cohort only 10 percent and for the 2002 cohort only 1 
percent compared to all other men (see Tab. 3 and Tab. 7). For males in East 
Germany similar effects are found whereas the coefficient for females in West 
and East Germany have the same sign and a comparable size but are only 
weakly significant. Disabled males have similarly small hazard ratios compared to 
the reference group. The results are not as robust as for the elderly because the 
number of cases is considerably smaller, especially for females and in East Ger-
many. Possessing a university degree reduces the sanction probability signifi-
cantly only for men in West Germany, if other factors are controlled for. 
The hypotheses regarding individual characteristics seem to be confirmed in 
those cases. The imposition of benefit sanctions is highly selective and depends 
on the age, qualification and health of the unemployed. It appears, however, that 
the existence of children in the household does not influence the imposition of 
benefit sanctions as neither the coefficient for young children nor for a higher 
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number of children turns out to be significant in any of the models. As expected 
the benefit level is negatively related to the imposition of sanctions in West and 
East Germany. The relationship is consistent over different inflow cohorts and 
regions but only statistically significant for the West German men in 2001. 
 
Tab. 3 Determinants of a benefit sanction, Cloglog proportional hazards model 
in discrete time, West Germany, Men, inflows into unemployment in 
2001  
 Coefficients (without 
heterogeneity terms) 
Coefficients (with  
heterogeneity terms) 
Hazard ratios (with 
heterogeneity terms) 
 Coeff. Std. Er.1 Coeff. Std. Er.1 Coeff. Std. Er.1 
Baseline hazard   
1-3 months -0.4245** 0.1295 -3.2335** 0.3384 0.0394** 0.0133 
4-6 months 0.1379 0.1290 -2.1617** 0.3036 0.1151** 0.0350 
7-9 months 0.1029 0.1420 -1.7693** 0.2893 0.1704** 0.0493 
10-12 months 0.2680 0.1500 -1.2449** 0.2626 0.2880** 0.0756 
13-15 months 0.2208 0.1697 -0.7941** 0.2274 0.4520** 0.1028 
Individual level covariates 
University degree -1.2070* 0.5109 -2.3215* 1.1676 0.0981* 0.1146 
No qualification -0.0816 0.0856 -0.1824   0.2079 0.8333 0.1733 
< 25 years 1.1320** 0.0991 1.5553** 0.2822 4.7365** 1.3365 
> 50 years -1.5916** 0.2171 -2.4621** 0.4503 0.0853** 0.0384 
Immigrants 0.1542 0.1010 -0.3119 0.5212 0.7321 0.3815 
Disabled -1.4603** 0.4148 -2.7554** 0.6622 0.0636** 0.0421 
> 2 children -0.0788 0.1987 0.2496 0.4943 1.2835 0.6344 
Child < 3 years  -0.2686 0.1748 -0.6119 1.7699 0.5423 0.9599 
Benefits -0.0405** 0.0054 -0.0637** 0.0176 0.9382** 0.0165 
Prev. unemployment -0.4221* 0.1912 0.5453 0.5578 1.7252 0.9623 
Prev. sanctions 1.0902** 0.2501 0.9906 0.6758 2.6929 1.8200 
Other penalties 0.3724 0.2662 0.1197 1.1184 1.1272 1.2606 
Regional level covariates 
Personnel resources -0.0016 0.0009 -0.0022 0.0020 0.9978 0.0020 
Sec. labor market -0.0113 0.0365 0.0391 0.1055 1.0399 0.1097 
Unemployment rate -0.1352** 0.0266 -0.1368 0.1242 0.8721 0.1083 
Avg. unempl. duration 0.1506 0.3246 -0.8560 0.6223 0.4249 0.2644 
Vacancy rate 0.0009 0.0013 -0.0039 0.0032 0.9961 0.0032 
Constant -3.9287** 0.8667 0.2598 1.7186  
Unobserved heterogeneity at individual level 
ε1  -1.2962** 0.0732  
ε2  5.4130  
Prob(ε1)  0.8068  
Prob(ε2)  0.1932  
Unobserved heterogeneity at regional level 
ε3  -0.4486** 0.1250  
ε4  1.2477  
Prob(ε1)  0.7355  
Prob(ε2)  0.2645  
Log likelihood -4,974.1403 -3,684.6009 
AIC 9,994.2806 8,540.1914 
No. observations 45,861 45,861 
1 White/Huber robust standard errors.  2 Variable determined outcome perfectly and was left out of 
the model. * Significance at 5% level.  ** Significance at 1% level. 
Sources: IEB and the authors’ own calculations. 
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Tab. 4 Determinants of a benefit sanction, Cloglog proportional hazards model 
in discrete time, West Germany, Women, inflows into unemployment in 
2001  
 Coefficients (without 
heterogeneity terms) 
Coefficients (with  
heterogeneity terms) 
Hazard ratios (with 
heterogeneity terms) 
 Coeff. Std. Er.1 Coeff. Std. Er.1 Coeff. Std. Er.1 
Baseline hazard   
1-3 months -0.8915** 0.2272 -4.3761** 0.4463 0.0126** 0.0056 
4-6 months -0.3830 0.2181 -3.0560** 0.3068 0.0471** 0.0144 
7-9 months 0.0288 0.2176 -2.0717** 0.3921 0.1260** 0.0494 
10-12 months -0.0384 0.2383 -1.3931** 0.2879 0.2483** 0.0715 
13-15 months 0.0660 0.2548 -0.5960* 0.2511 0.5510* 0.1383 
Individual level covariates 
University degree -0.4265 0.5220 0.2009 0.8670 1.2225 1.0600 
No qualification 0.2973* 0.1340 0.7257* 0.3416 2.0662* 0.7059 
< 25 years 1.8301** 0.1582 2.8005** 0.3670 16.4536** 6.0379 
> 50 years -1.3849** 0.2600 -0.9437 0.5330 0.3892 0.2074 
Immigrants -0.0096 0.1961 -0.5359 0.2987 0.5852 0.1748 
Disabled 0.0798 0.3650 -0.9134 1.0852 0.4012 0.4354 
> 2 children -0.1674 0.3906 -0.7569 0.7781 0.4691 0.3650 
Child < 3 years  -0.1370 0.2117 0.9680 1.7199 2.6327 4.5279 
Benefits -0.0089 0.0088 0.0171 0.0282 1.0173 0.0287 
Prev. unemployment 0.4750 0.2933 0.4738 0.3759 1.6061 0.6038 
Prev. sanctions 2.2356** 0.4296 4.8982** 0.7657 134.0454** 102.6442 
Other penalties -0.0438 0.6229 1.8279 1.3263 6.2210 8.2510 
Regional level covariates 
Personnel resources -0.0002 0.0013 0.0015 0.0047 1.0015 0.0047 
Sec. labor market 0.0449 0.0493 -0.0922 0.0834 0.9120 0.0761 
Unemployment rate 0.0147 0.0402 -0.0054 0.0621 0.9947 0.0618 
Avg. unempl. duration -1.4681** 0.4723 -2.1326** 0.8994 0.1185** 0.1066 
Vacancy rate 0.0078** 0.0017 0.0149** 0.0034 1.0150** 0.0034 
Constant -2.5394* 1.2748 -2.7115 3.1090  
Unobserved heterogeneity at individual level 
ε1  -0.8645** 0.1076  
ε2  6.8588  
Prob(ε1)  0.8881  
Prob(ε2)  0.1119  
Unobserved heterogeneity at regional level 
ε3  -0.7322** 0.2146  
ε4  1.6017  
Prob(ε1)  0.6863  
Prob(ε2)  0.3137  
Log likelihood -2,173.6099 -1,859.5773 
AIC 4,393.2198 3,773.1546 
No. observations 31,190 31,190 
1 White/Huber robust standard errors.  2 Variable determined outcome perfectly and was left out of 
the model. * Significance at 5% level.  ** Significance at 1% level. 
Sources: IEB and the authors’ own calculations. 
 
The differences in the sanction rate with regard to observable socio-economic 
characteristics can also be illustrated graphically by plotting predicted sanction 
probabilities for different unemployment durations and diverse sub-groups of the 
sample. In Fig. 1 this is done for the two age groups below 25 and above 50 
years of age for West Germany and the inflow cohorts from the year 2001. 
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Fig. 1 Predicted transition probabilities by age group, West Germany, inflows 
into unemployment in 2001 
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Sources: IEB and the authors’ own calculations. 
 
Clearly, for both men and women it holds that individuals who are younger than 
25 years of age have above-average sanction probabilities. Older persons above 
the age of 50 years, however, are practically in no danger of risking a penalty. 
Their predicted transition probabilities lie way below the average and are nearly 
zero. One has to keep in mind that these group effects are modeled to be con-
stant over time. The group differences must not be interpreted as time-varying 
effects. The overall discrepancy in the sanction probability is the difference be-
tween the areas under both functions. In Fig. 2 the same graphs are drawn for 
low and highly qualified people. The predicted probability of getting sanctioned 
for individuals without a formal qualification is markedly higher than for persons 
who have a university degree. The difference can mainly be attributed to the 
small sanction risk for highly qualified individuals whereas the sanction probability 
for low-qualified persons ranges only slightly above the average for all men or 
women. Fig. 4 to Fig. 9 in the Appendix demonstrate that these patterns are also 
valid for the inflow cohorts of the year 2002 and East Germany. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Predicted transition probabilities by level of qualification, West Germany, 
inflows into unemployment in 2001 
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Sources: IEB and the authors’ own calculations. 
 14
For West Germany an important determinant of the sanction probability is the 
previous incidence of benefit sanctions over the individual’s labor market history. 
Its positive effect on the sanction probability is robust for males and females as 
well as for different inflow cohorts (cf. WZB and infas, 2006). The size of the ef-
fect is considerable: The hazard ratio for males in West Germany who had re-
ceived a sanction before they entered unemployment during the observation pe-
riod is two times higher than that of previously not sanctioned men. For women 
the effect is markedly higher: for the 2002 inflow cohort the hazard ratio of previ-
ously sanctioned women is ten times, for the 2001 inflows more than 100 times 
higher than for the not sanctioned unemployed (see Tab. 3 and 4 as well as Tab. 
7 and 8 in the Appendix). Two important caveats have to be made here. First, the 
large size of the effect for women should be seen in the light of a relatively low 
number of observations. Second, the substantial interpretation of this variable 
remains somewhat vague. As discussed in section 2 above certain unobservable 
characteristics should affect individual sanction probabilities. These factors might 
be captured in this variable which is why one does not measure the causal effect 
of previous sanctions on the incidence of current sanctions. 
Note that there is no such consistent pattern in East Germany (see Tab. 9 to 12 
in the Appendix). With the sanction probability being generally lower and labor 
market conditions more tight a recurrence of sanctions is relatively seldom. The 
same positive relationship does in general not hold for other types of short penal-
ties whose coefficients are insignificant in most models. Apparently these types 
of misconduct (like missing an appointment or registering too late) happen rather 
randomly and are not related to the sort of misbehavior that is followed by a ‘real’ 
benefit sanction. 
With regard to the observed covariates on the regional level some of the ex-
pected relationships are reflected in the empirical results. The coefficients of the 
average unemployment duration show negative signs and are statistically signifi-
cant in most models. For example, if the average unemployment duration in the 
region increases by one week the hazard ratio for the female inflow cohort of the 
year 2001 is only about 10 percent as high as before (see Tab. 4). Moreover, the 
vacancy rate and size of the secondary labor market are positively related to the 
imposition of benefit sanctions and significant in some of the estimations as they 
present opportunities to impose penalties. In general the likelihood of receiving a 
benefit sanction is greater under more favorable labor market conditions, i.e. a 
lower level and duration of unemployment and higher demand for labor.  
Finally, note that unobserved heterogeneity is clearly present in the data with 
respect to the transition process from unemployment into a benefit sanction. The 
freely estimated heterogeneity terms (ε1, ε3) on the individual and on the regional 
level are highly significant throughout the various models. The coefficients of the 
covariates, their standard errors and the overall likelihood change considerably 
when heterogeneity is introduced compared to a model without heterogeneity. In 
all estimations the model which includes unobserved heterogeneity is clearly fa-
vored according to Akaike’s information criterion (see Tab. 3 and 4 as well as 
Tab. 7 to 12 in the Appendix). On the individual level this confirms the hypothesis 
that in addition to observable individual characteristics some unobserved factors 
(like motivation or risk aversion) are at play determining the individual sanction 
probabilities. The results show that given the observed covariates there are two 
groups of individuals with high and low sanction probabilities. 
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Moreover, the significant heterogeneity terms on the regional level suggest that 
groups of agencies differ with regard to the sanction probability after observed 
and unobserved individual as well as observed regional factors are controlled for. 
This finding supports the hypothesis that – aside from his or her socio-economic 
and behavioral characteristics – the UI benefit recipient’s place of residence in-
fluences the probability of being sanctioned. Aside from unobserved context vari-
ables a plausible explanation would be an uneven imposition of benefit sanctions 
in Germany which confirms previous results from implementation research (cf. 
Müller and Oschmiansky, 2006). The individual probability of receiving a benefit 
sanction is therefore also influenced by the sanction policy of the local employ-
ment agency. Again, it is possible to illustrate this effect by way of plotting pre-
dicted transition probabilities which are conditioned on different values for the 
heterogeneity terms on the regional level (see Fig. 3). Thereby the other (individ-
ual) heterogeneity terms are conditioned to be equal to zero. 
 
Fig. 3 Predicted transition probabilities conditioned on regional heterogeneity 
groups, West Germany, inflows into unemployment in 2001 
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Sources: IEB and the authors’ own calculations. 
 
In Fig. 3 it is shown that falling into a group with a higher sanction probability sig-
nificantly increases the individual probability of receiving a benefit sanction. For 
the West German inflow cohorts from 2001 the risk of getting sanctioned ceteris 
paribus increases by factor three if an individual would move from the group of 
agencies with a low sanction rate into an agency with a higher sanction rate. This 
is a substantial difference and indicates that benefit recipients from different 
agencies may not be treated equally over different employment agencies. 
 
6 Conclusions 
This paper investigated the individual and regional determinants of UI benefit 
sanctions in Germany utilizing a newly available and very rich individual data set 
from the German PES. On the basis of descriptive statistics and a multivariate 
hazard rate model that controlled for unobserved heterogeneity on the individual 
and regional level the individual transition rate from unemployment into a sanc-
tion was analyzed for inflows into unemployment between 2001 and 2002. Only 
sanctions after the refusal of a job offer or the rejection of a placement into a 
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measure of ALMP which carried an effective reduction of benefit payments were 
considered here. 
It was shown that the overall incidence rate of sanctions is rather small. Most of 
the benefit sanctions are imposed in the first six months of the unemployment 
spell. The descriptive statistics illustrated the differences between the groups of 
sanctioned and non-sanctioned individuals with respect to individual characteris-
tics. Younger unemployed (<25 years) are noticeably, and to a lesser degree also 
low-qualified people, overrepresented in the pool of sanctioned unemployed. On 
the contrary, women, older unemployed (>50 years) and disabled persons have a 
lower share in the group of the sanctioned compared to all other benefit recipi-
ents. 
Most of the theoretically derived hypotheses are reflected in the empirical results, 
if observed and unobserved factors on the individual and regional level are taken 
into account in a discrete time hazard rate model. Among the socio-demographic 
characteristics the age categories, especially the one for younger unemployed, 
remain statistically significant determinants of the imposition of benefit sanctions 
for West and East Germany. Apparently younger benefit recipients face a higher, 
older unemployed a markedly lower risk of getting a benefit sanction. Another 
cleavage in the risk of getting sanctioned is constituted by the level of qualifica-
tion. Individuals who possess a university degree have ceteris paribus a signifi-
cantly lower sanction probability. If other individual and regional factors are held 
constant, persons without a formal qualification are sanctioned only slightly more 
often than the average individual. Moreover, as was expected, disabled persons 
have a significantly lower risk of being sanctioned by the employment agency. 
Another very strong individual determinant of benefit penalties was found to be 
the previous incidence of benefit sanctions over the individual’s labor market his-
tory. This was interpreted as an indication that unobserved behavioral character-
istics (like risk aversion or conformity to the rules) may influence the individual’s 
sanction probability. That would mean that the group of sanctioned individuals 
differs from other unemployed with respect to its labor market behavior as sug-
gested by previous theoretical and empirical research. Other types of shorter 
sanctions are not consistently related to the benefit sanctions that were consid-
ered here. Those breaches of rules seem to happen rather randomly.  
Moreover, it was demonstrated that, having controlled for all observed factors 
and unobserved heterogeneity on the individual level, there are groups of em-
ployment agencies with either high or low sanction probabilities. This could be 
explained by unobserved context variables. It is plausible, though, to partially 
attribute these differences to a systematic variation in the implementation of the 
sanction rules. That means that a person’s individual probability of receiving a 
penalty also depends on the sanction policy of the local PES agency. People who 
live in employment districts with a stricter sanction policy are indeed sanctioned 
more often. This means that unemployment benefit recipients are not treated 
equally with regard to the sanction rules. The question which follows from this 
result is, if a higher (regional) sanction rate increases the inflow into employment 
which could justify such inequalities? This more complicated issue concerning 
the labor market impact of sanctions could not be tackled in this paper and re-
mains thus a question for future research. 
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Appendix 
Tab. 5 Definition of control variables measured at the level of regional employ-
ment agencies 
Variable Definition 
Regional labor market conditions 
Unemployment rate Number of registered unemployed divided by the civilian labor force  
(in percent) 
Average duration of 
unemployment 
Average duration of unemployment in weeks. Approximation:  
52*
)(*5,0 ntunemploymefromexitsentries
unemployedofstockaveragedurationntunemployme +=
 
Share of benefits 
recipients 
Average stock of unemployment insurance recipients divided by aver-
age stock of all unemployed (in percent) 
Ratio between unem-
ployed and vacancies 
Ratio of newly registered unemployed and newly registered vacancies 
(in percent) 
Employment growth Percentage change in number of employed with mandatory social secu-
rity coverage in December of current year in relation to number in De-
cember of preceding year (in percent) 
Service sector share Number of employed service-sector persons with mandatory social 
security coverage divided by total number of employed persons with 
mandatory social security coverage (in percent) 
Population density Population density of the district served by the public employment 
agency in the year 2000 
Seasonality indicator Spread between minimum and maximum monthly stock of unemploy-
ment; moving average for year of reference (2001) 
Regional employment offices 
Size of the secondary 
labor market 
Inflow of persons in job creation schemes (ABM) and structural adjust-
ment measures (SAM) divided by newly unemployed persons (in per-
cent) 
Personnel resources Average stock of unemployed divided by the number of job counselors 
(‘Arbeitsvermittler’ and ‘Arbeitsberater’) in employment agencies 
 
Tab. 6 Descriptive statistics, control variables measured at the level of regional 
employment agencies, West Germany, 2001-2004 
Variable West Germany East Germany 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Sanction rate 1.06 0.68 0.51 0.37 
Personnel resources 407.15 65.04 433.06 63.64 
Secondary labor market 0.83 0.85 6.24 4.20 
Unemployment rate 9.05 2.46 19.98 3.62 
Average duration of unemployment 3.27 0.18 3.50 0.12 
Ratio between unemployed and vacancies 41.31 19.49 28.35 10.40 
Service sector share 67.23 8.75 76.00 12.13 
Employment growth -1.58 1.85 -1.57 9.18 
Sources: Register data from the Federal Employment Agency and the author’s own calculations. 
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Tab. 7 Determinants of a benefit sanction, Cloglog proportional hazards model 
in discrete time, West Germany, Men, inflows into unemployment in 
2002  
 Coefficients (without 
heterogeneity terms) 
Coefficients (with  
heterogeneity terms) 
Hazard ratios (with 
heterogeneity terms) 
 Coeff. Std. Er.1 Coeff. Std. Er.1 Coeff. Std. Er.1 
Baseline hazard   
1-3 months -0.6361** 0.1607 -2.2064** 0.2199 0.1101** 0.0242 
4-6 months 0.0595 0.1533 -0.8715** 0.2169 0.4183** 0.0907 
7-9 months 0.2578 0.1586 -0.4445** 0.1603 0.6412** 0.1028 
10-12 months 0.4423** 0.1648 -0.1990 0.1775 0.8196 0.1455 
13-15 months 0.3486 0.1893 -0.2283 0.1792 0.7959 0.1426 
Individual level covariates 
University degree -0.5818 0.4560 -1.9514* 0.7920 0.1421* 0.1125 
No qualification -0.0706 0.1008 0.2087 0.1388 1.2321 0.1710 
< 25 years 1.1159** 0.1166 0.2478 0.1748 1.2812 0.2240 
> 50 years -2.4721** 0.4127 -4.7822** 0.5142 0.0084** 0.0043 
Immigrants 0.3352** 0.1252 0.2245 0.1444 1.2517 0.1808 
Disabled -1.8548** 0.7121 -3.6463** 1.1596 0.0261** 0.0302 
> 2 children -0.4432 0.2793 -0.9798** 0.2766 0.3754** 0.1038 
Child < 3 years  -0.1003 0.2150 -0.4110 0.3257 0.6630 0.2159 
Benefits -0.0310** 0.0058 -0.0195 0.0117 0.9807 0.0114 
Prev. unemployment 0.0208 0.2616 -0.5654 0.3244 0.5681 0.1843 
Prev. sanctions 1.0244** 0.2666 0.7384** 0.2497 2.0925** 0.5225 
Other penalties -0.1350 0.4439 0.1624 0.5851 1.1764 0.6883 
Regional level covariates 
Personnel resources 0.0003 0.0010 0.0006 0.0013 1.0006 0.0013 
Sec. labor market 0.0008 0.0605 0.0885 0.0972 1.0926 0.1062 
Unemployment rate -0.0399 0.0290 -0.0098 0.0317 0.9902 0.0313 
Avg. unempl. duration -1.4332** 0.4127 -1.6453** 0.5617 0.1930** 0.1084 
Vacancy rate -0.0019 0.0023 -0.0049 0.0036 0.9952 0.0036 
Constant -1.0015 0.9768 -14.1212 49.6255  
Unobserved heterogeneity at individual level 
ε1  -3.6546 9.8461  
ε2  17.6210  
Prob(ε1)  0.8282  
Prob(ε2)  0.1718  
Unobserved heterogeneity at regional level 
ε3  0.4766** 0.1711  
ε4  -3.9515  
Prob(ε1)  0.8924  
Prob(ε2)  0.1076  
Log likelihood -3,684.6009 -3,112.5617 
AIC 7,415.2018 6,279.1243 
No. observations 48,633 48,633 
1 White/Huber robust standard errors.  2 Variable determined outcome perfectly and was left out of 
the model. * Significance at 5% level.  ** Significance at 1% level. 
Sources: IEB and the authors’ own calculations. 
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Tab. 8 Determinants of a benefit sanction, Cloglog proportional hazards model 
in discrete time, West Germany, Women, inflows into unemployment in 
2002  
 Coefficients (without 
heterogeneity terms) 
Coefficients (with  
heterogeneity terms) 
Hazard ratios (with 
heterogeneity terms) 
 Coeff. Std. Er.1 Coeff. Std. Er.1 Coeff. Std. Er.1 
Baseline hazard   
1-3 months -0.8250** 0.2577 -3.6137** 0.3822 0.0270** 0.0103 
4-6 months -0.0882 0.2412 -2.3672** 0.3300 0.0937** 0.0309 
7-9 months -0.1375 0.2706 -1.8795** 0.3925 0.1527** 0.0599 
10-12 months 0.1177 0.2745 -1.2730** 0.3589 0.2800** 0.1005 
13-15 months 0.1615 0.3016 -0.9566** 0.3313 0.3842** 0.1273 
Individual level covariates 
University degree   
No qualification 0.1380 0.1603 0.1164 0.3467 1.1234 0.3894 
< 25 years 1.7726** 0.1706 1.8102** 0.4154 6.1117** 2.5386 
> 50 years -1.4986** 0.4275 -3.5702* 1.5870 0.0281* 0.0447 
Immigrants 0.4222 0.2312 0.7220 0.4545 2.0586 0.9357 
Disabled -0.6215 0.7225 -0.4927 1.6704 0.6109 1.0205 
> 2 children -0.4347 0.5192 1.1721 0.8647 3.2287 2.7919 
Child < 3 years  -0.4806 0.3039 -1.1578 0.7051 0.3142 0.2215 
Benefits -0.0351** 0.0107 -0.0502 0.0329 0.9511 0.0313 
Prev. unemployment -0.4264 0.4552 -0.7837 1.1237 0.4567 0.5132 
Prev. sanctions 1.9845** 0.7660 2.8240** 0.8299 16.8433** 13.9788 
Other penalties -0.1550 1.0184 -3.8932** 0.7955 0.0204** 0.0162 
Regional level covariates 
Personnel resources -0.0014 0.0017 0.0016 0.0030 1.0016 0.0031 
Sec. labor market -0.0911 0.1262 0.4943** 0.1818 1.6394** 0.2981 
Unemployment rate -0.0155 0.0514 -0.0964 0.0747 0.9081 0.0678 
Avg. unempl. duration -0.9589 0.7458 -1.5723 1.4965 0.2076 0.3106 
Vacancy rate -0.0069 0.0043 -0.0115 0.0063 0.9886 0.0062 
Constant -2.6555 1.9441 -3.8028 5.1043  
Unobserved heterogeneity at individual level 
ε1  -0.9571** 0.2067  
ε2  8.3224  
Prob(ε1)  0.8969  
Prob(ε2)  0.1031  
Unobserved heterogeneity at regional level 
ε3  -1.480** 0.4953  
ε4  0.8342  
Prob(ε1)  0.3605  
Prob(ε2)  0.6395  
Log likelihood -1,420.6023 -1,211.4285 
AIC 2,885.2046 2,474.8570 
No. observations 31,695 31,695 
1 White/Huber robust standard errors.  2 Variable determined outcome perfectly and was left out of 
the model. * Significance at 5% level.  ** Significance at 1% level. 
Sources: IEB and the authors’ own calculations. 
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Tab. 9 Determinants of a benefit sanction, Cloglog proportional hazards model 
in discrete time, East Germany, Men, inflows into unemployment in 2001  
 Coefficients (without 
heterogeneity terms) 
Coefficients (with  
heterogeneity terms) 
Hazard ratios (with 
heterogeneity terms) 
 Coeff. Std. Er.1 Coeff. Std. Er.1 Coeff. Std. Er.1 
Baseline hazard   
1-3 months -0.3788 0.2103 -2.4911** 0.3752 0.0828** 0.0311 
4-6 months 0.0918 0.2079 -1.3419** 0.3422 0.2614** 0.0894 
7-9 months 0.0758 0.2169 -0.8896** 0.3253 0.4108** 0.1337 
10-12 months -0.0982 0.2483 -0.9300** 0.3495 0.3945** 0.1379 
13-15 months 0.2716 0.2510 -0.4352 0.2873 0.6471 0.1859 
Individual level covariates 
University degree -1.4275 0.9970 -3.2047 3.9026 0.0406 0.1583 
No qualification 0.0081 0.1588 -0.1555 0.3805 0.8560 0.3257 
< 25 years 1.2225** 0.1486 0.8710 0.5097 2.3893 1.2178 
> 50 years -1.2208** 0.2806 -2.5520** 0.7241 0.0779** 0.0564 
Immigrants 0.5937 0.3146 -0.1059 0.5449 0.8995 0.4901 
Disabled -1.0990 0.7113 -2.2758* 0.9550 0.1027* 0.0981 
> 2 children -0.2993 0.4868 -0.4637 0.6492 0.6289 0.4083 
Child < 3 years  0.3808 0.2516 0.3050 0.4841 1.3567 0.6567 
Benefits -0.0344** 0.0104 -0.0139 0.0257 0.9862 0.0254 
Prev. unemployment -0.3657 0.3434 -1.0062 0.7169 0.3656 0.2621 
Prev. sanctions   
Other penalties   
Regional level covariates 
Personnel resources -0.0019* 0.0009 -0.0007 0.0019 0.9993 0.0019 
Sec. labor market 0.0023 0.0148 -0.0264 0.0247 0.9740 0.0241 
Unemployment rate 0.0489 0.0290 0.1577** 0.0604 1.1708** 0.0708 
Avg. unempl. duration -1.9716** 0.6598 -3.5716* 1.4407 0.0281* 0.0405 
Vacancy rate 0.0124* 0.0059 0.0288** 0.0094 1.0292** 0.0097 
Constant -0.2899 2.0023 0.1998 3.9901  
Unobserved heterogeneity at individual level 
ε1  -0.7841** 0.0987  
ε2  7.4139  
Prob(ε1)  0.9044  
Prob(ε2)  0.0956  
Unobserved heterogeneity at regional level 
ε3  -0.5663* 0.2420  
ε4  1.3827  
Prob(ε1)  0.7095  
Prob(ε2)  0.2905  
Log likelihood -2,238.3958 -1,920.4109 
AIC 4,518.7916 3,890.8218 
No. observations 43,357 43,357 
1 White/Huber robust standard errors.  2 Variable determined outcome perfectly and was left out of 
the model. * Significance at 5% level.  ** Significance at 1% level. 
Sources: IEB and the authors’ own calculations. 
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Tab. 10 Determinants of a benefit sanction, Cloglog proportional hazards model 
in discrete time, East Germany, Women, inflows into unemployment in 
2001  
 Coefficients (without 
heterogeneity terms) 
Coefficients (with  
heterogeneity terms) 
Hazard ratios (with 
heterogeneity terms) 
 Coeff. Std. Er.1 Coeff. Std. Er.1 Coeff. Std. Er.1 
Baseline hazard   
1-3 months -1.4874** 0.4631 -3.9250** 0.6278 0.0197** 0.0124 
4-6 months -0.2340 0.4166 -2.1323** 0.6250 0.1186** 0.0741 
7-9 months 0.1460 0.3937 -1.6063** 0.5513 0.2006** 0.1106 
10-12 months -0.3691 0.4635 -1.8344** 0.4805 0.1597** 0.0768 
13-15 months 0.0690 0.4394 -0.9736 0.5269 0.3777 0.1990 
Individual level covariates 
University degree 0.4070 1.0464 2.2498 1.9517 9.4857 18.5130 
No qualification 0.0995 0.3107 -1.0987* 0.5177 0.3333* 0.1725 
< 25 years 2.4522** 0.3711 2.8774** 0.5665 17.7687** 10.0656 
> 50 years -0.9984 0.5444 -2.9713 2.0296 0.0512 0.1040 
Immigrants 0.2027 1.0157 -0.5416 0.5633 0.5818 0.3277 
Disabled    
> 2 children -0.0022 0.7324 4.8129** 1.1351 123.0842** 139.7187 
Child < 3 years  -0.8079 0.5366 -0.5224 0.7897 0.5931 0.4684 
Benefits -0.0438 0.0264 -0.0451 0.0346 0.9559 0.0331 
Prev. unemployment 0.6933 0.6214 1.5448 0.9620 4.6870 4.5090 
Prev. sanctions 0.4081 0.8302 0.3822 0.7936 1.4655 1.1630 
Other penalties 2.8216* 1.1058 2.0868** 0.7524 8.0588** 6.0632 
Regional level covariates 
Personnel resources 0.0024 0.0018 -0.0013 0.0035 0.9987 0.0035 
Sec. labor market -0.0475 0.0361 -0.0220 0.0542 0.9782 0.0530 
Unemployment rate 0.0726 0.0557 0.0082 0.0786 1.0082 0.0793 
Avg. unempl. duration -4.5465** 1.6909 -3.4065 2.1425 0.0332 0.0710 
Vacancy rate 0.0150 0.0118 -0.0039 0.0227 0.9961 0.0226 
Constant 4.8645 4.8074 -10.4805 .  
Unobserved heterogeneity at individual level 
ε1  -1.2756** 0.3738  
ε2  20.6890  
Prob(ε1)  0.9419  
Prob(ε2)  0.0581  
Unobserved heterogeneity at regional level 
ε3  0.2543 0.1719  
ε4  -1.8469   
Prob(ε1)  0.8790   
Prob(ε2)  0.1210   
Log likelihood -1,420.6023 -562.9643 
AIC 2,885.2046 1,177.9287 
No. observations 37,726 37,726 
1 White/Huber robust standard errors.  2 Variable determined outcome perfectly and was left out of 
the model. * Significance at 5% level.  ** Significance at 1% level. 
Sources: IEB and the authors’ own calculations. 
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Tab. 11 Determinants of a benefit sanction, Cloglog proportional hazards model 
in discrete time, East Germany, Men, inflows into unemployment in 2002  
 Coefficients (without 
heterogeneity terms) 
Coefficients (with  
heterogeneity terms) 
Hazard ratios (with 
heterogeneity terms) 
 Coeff. Std. Er.1 Coeff. Std. Er.1 Coeff. Std. Er.1 
Baseline hazard   
1-3 months 0.1300 0.2803 -3.5506** 0.3323 0.0287** 0.0095 
4-6 months 0.4781 0.2832 -2.6633** 0.3547 0.0697** 0.0247 
7-9 months 0.7163* 0.2941 -2.0159** 0.3430 0.1332** 0.0457 
10-12 months 0.8968** 0.3007 -1.3866** 0.2785 0.2499** 0.0696 
13-15 months 0.6897* 0.3350 -1.2676** 0.2436 0.2815** 0.0686 
Individual level covariates 
University degree -0.7586 1.0301 -2.0931** 0.7219 0.1233** 0.0890 
No qualification -0.1096 0.2081 0.3437 0.3394 1.4102 0.4787 
< 25 years 1.4550** 0.2005 1.4634** 0.5172 4.3207** 2.2345 
> 50 years -1.2339** 0.4011 -2.9246* 1.1458 0.0537* 0.0615 
Immigrants 0.5210 0.6022 2.5231** 0.3326 12.4668** 4.1467 
Disabled -0.6676 0.7153 2.3285** 0.8482 10.2630** 8.7052 
> 2 children -0.7564 0.9776 -1.2400 1.1568 0.2894 0.3348 
Child < 3 years  -1.4093* 0.7160 -3.0339 2.1854 0.0481 0.1052 
Benefits -0.0229 0.0131 -0.0200 0.0290 0.9802 0.0284 
Prev. unemployment -0.3030 0.4533 3.1311** 0.8621 22.8982** 19.7413 
Prev. sanctions 0.2985 0.7320 -2.2958* 0.9825 0.1007* 0.0989 
Other penalties 0.7461 0.5536 -0.8014 0.5888 0.4487 0.2642 
Regional level covariates 
Personnel resources -0.0076** 0.0016 -0.0025 0.0033 0.9975 0.0033 
Sec. labor market 0.0390* 0.0193 0.0356 0.0220 1.0362 0.0228 
Unemployment rate -0.0201 0.0414 -0.0426 0.0569 0.9583 0.0545 
Avg. unempl. duration -0.9763 1.1014 -2.9457* 1.5030 0.0526* 0.0790 
Vacancy rate -0.0102 0.0088 -0.0122 0.0161 0.9879 0.0159 
Constant -0.7834 2.9013 0.3475 4.1542  
Unobserved heterogeneity at individual level 
ε1  -0.8065** 0.1271  
ε2  10.6680  
Prob(ε1)  0.9298  
Prob(ε2)  0.0702  
Unobserved heterogeneity at regional level 
ε3  0.7148** 0.2602  
ε4  -0.6115  
Prob(ε1)  0.4610  
Prob(ε2)  0.5390  
Log likelihood -1,359.7631 -1,147.0222 
AIC 2,765.5262 2,348.0444 
No. observations 41,451 41,451 
1 White/Huber robust standard errors.  2 Variable determined outcome perfectly and was left out of 
the model. * Significance at 5% level.  ** Significance at 1% level. 
Sources: IEB and the authors’ own calculations. 
 25
Tab. 12 Determinants of a benefit sanction, Cloglog proportional hazards model 
in discrete time, East Germany, Women, inflows into unemployment in 
2002  
 Coefficients (without 
heterogeneity terms) 
Coefficients (with  
heterogeneity terms) 
Hazard ratios (with 
heterogeneity terms) 
 Coeff. Std. Er.1 Coeff. Std. Er.1 Coeff. Std. Er.1 
Baseline hazard   
1-3 months -0.7233 0.5184 -3.8796** 0.9953 0.0207** 0.0206 
4-6 months 0.3262 0.4187 -2.6888** 0.7669 0.0680** 0.0521 
7-9 months 0.8465 0.3813 -1.6218* 0.7483 0.1975* 0.1478 
10-12 months 0.6261 0.4626 -0.5728 0.5064 0.5640 0.2856 
13-15 months -0.3281 0.6523 -1.1048 0.6279 0.3313 0.2080 
Individual level covariates 
University degree 0.4246 1.0208 1.2789 1.0580 3.5929 3.8011 
No qualification -1.1606* 0.5572 -2.9907** 0.8823 0.0503** 0.0443 
< 25 years 1.8738** 0.3011 2.0367** 0.4706 7.6654** 3.6072 
> 50 years -1.2159 0.7484 -3.6527* 1.6982 0.0259* 0.0440 
Immigrants 0.9306 1.0632 3.1386* 1.2633 23.0704* 29.1450 
Disabled   
> 2 children   
Child < 3 years  -1.1413 0.6103 -0.9542 0.6594 0.3851 0.2539 
Benefits -0.0980** 0.0285 -0.1466* 0.0585 0.8636* 0.0505 
Prev. unemployment -2.3577* 0.9676 -4.1943** 1.1510 0.0151** 0.0174 
Prev. sanctions 2.7994* 1.1002 6.9483** 0.9463 1041.4270** 985.4546 
Other penalties 3.8672** 1.2505 4.4367** 1.1210 84.4988** 94.7224 
Regional level covariates 
Personnel resources -0.0031 0.0028 -0.0172** 0.0062 0.9829** 0.0061 
Sec. labor market 0.0056 0.0483 0.0786 0.0532 1.0818 0.0576 
Unemployment rate 0.1007 0.0667 -0.0554 0.1462 0.9461 0.1383 
Avg. unempl. duration -3.8338* 1.8291 1.8008 2.9969 6.0545 18.1447 
Vacancy rate -0.0276 0.0216 -0.0554* 0.0233 0.9461** 0.0221 
Constant 6.2503 5.2401 2.2417 1.9860  
Unobserved heterogeneity at individual level 
ε1  -5.7498 0.5965  
ε2  2.7200  
Prob(ε1)  0.9472  
Prob(ε2)  0.0528  
Unobserved heterogeneity at regional level 
ε3  -0.5431** 0.7614  
ε4  0.5431  
Prob(ε1)  0.1586  
Prob(ε2)  0.8414  
Log likelihood -509.8479 -453.5190 
AIC 1,061.6959 957.0381 
No. observations 31,679 31,679 
1 White/Huber robust standard errors.  2 Variable determined outcome perfectly and was left out of 
the model. * Significance at 5% level.  ** Significance at 1% level. 
Sources: IEB and the authors’ own calculations. 
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Fig. 4 Predicted transition probabilities by age group, West Germany, inflows 
into unemployment in 2002 
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Sources: IEB and the authors’ own calculations. 
 
Fig. 5 Predicted transition probabilities by level of qualification, West Germany, 
inflows into unemployment in 2002 
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Sources: IEB and the authors’ own calculations. 
 
Fig. 6 Predicted transition probabilities by age group, East Germany, inflows 
into unemployment in 2001 
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Sources: IEB and the authors’ own calculations. 
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Fig. 7 Predicted transition probabilities by age group, East Germany, inflows 
into unemployment in 2002 
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Sources: IEB and the authors’ own calculations. 
 
Fig. 8 Predicted transition probabilities by level of qualification, East Germany, 
inflows into unemployment in 2001 
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Sources: IEB and the authors’ own calculations. 
 
Fig. 9 Predicted transition probabilities by level of qualification, East Germany, 
inflows into unemployment in 2002 
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Sources: IEB and the authors’ own calculations. 
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Fig. 10 Predicted transition probabilities conditioned on regional heterogeneity 
groups, West Germany, inflows into unemployment in 2002 
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Sources: IEB and the authors’ own calculations. 
 
Fig. 11 Predicted transition probabilities conditioned on regional heterogeneity 
groups, East Germany, inflows into unemployment in 2001 
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Sources: IEB and the authors’ own calculations. 
 
Fig. 12 Predicted transition probabilities conditioned on regional heterogeneity 
groups, East Germany, inflows into unemployment in 2002 
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